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The French Civil Code and Contract:
A Comparative Analysis of Formation
and Form,
Arthur von Mehren*
This article considers comparatively two basic areas of the
French and common law of contracts-formation and form. The
topic was chosen, from among the many possible subjects in the
field of contract law which would repay comparative study, in
part because it touches fundamental questions of contract law.
In addition, these two areas of contract law raise sharply (espe-
cially if the French law is found upon examination to be su-
perior to the common law2) a problem which transcends the
1. This article is a slightly revised version of a paper entitled "The
Code Citil and Contract-A Comparative Analysis of Formation and Form,^
read at the Sesquicentennial Celebration of the Code Napoleon held on
December 13, 14, and 15, 1954, at New York University. The proceedings of
the Celebration are to be published.
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
2. It should be noted that certain areas of the French law of contracts
are in a rather unsatisfactory state when compared with the common law.
For example, the French courts have not been able, in the absence of appli-
cable Code provisions, to develop satisfactory rules for handling contracts
by correspondence. The general rule appears to be that the offer can be
withdrawn at any time by a revocation communicated to the offeree (see
note 3 i nra) before acceptance and that the point at which the acceptance
becomes effective is a question of fact. The legal writers have argued,
advancing various theoretical justifications, that offers, at least if they set
a definite time period, should be irrevocable. See, e.g., 2 RIPERT & BOULANGER,
TRATr 2IL9MENTAIRE DE DROIT cIVIL DE PLANIOL 126-27, § 334 (4th ed. 1952)
(withdrawing of offer constitutes a fault); 2 CoLiN & CAPITANT, COURS bLt-
MENTAIRE DE DROIT CMVL FRAN9zIS 35-36, § 46 (10th ed., Julliot de ]a Morandibre
1953) (discusses three theories: civil delict, pre-contract to hold offer open,
unilaterally assumed obligation). The courts do not appear, as a general
matter, to have accepted these theories. See, e.g., de Portes v. Vuillier, Cour
de cassation, chambre civile, Feb. 3, 1919, [1923] Dalloz Jurisprudence [here-
inafter D.3 I. 126. A few cases can, however, be cited in support of the
proposition that, in certain situations, the offer is not fully revocable. See,
e.g., Schmitt v. Mey, Cour d'appel de Colmar, Feb. 4, 1936, (1936) Dalloz
Hebdomadaire 187 (pre-contract theory); Jahn v. Charry, Cour d'appel de
Bordeaux, Jan. 17, 1870, [1871] D. II. 96 (withdrawing of offer effective to
prevent a contract from arising, but considered a fault). It can be noted
that the commission preparing a draft for a new Civil Code has proposed
that "The offeror may revoke his offer if it has not yet been accepted.
However, when the offer sets a period for acceptance or such a period re-
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law of contracts as such-the problem of the relationship be-
tween the substantive solutions found in various areas of the
law and a legal system's general technique. Consequently, there
will be considered here both the differences in the treatment
accorded to formation and form in the French and common
laws, and the extent to which these differences are produced
by, and related to, the former's codified structure and the case
law system of the latter.
II
In French law a contract is created, as a matter of general
theory, by the parties agreeing to a proposition.3 The legal
sults from the circumstances of the case, the offer cannot be revoked before
this period has expired, except in the case where the offer has not yet come
to the attention of the offeree." TRAVAUX DE LA COMMISSION DE RtFORME DU
CODE CIVIL ANNtE-1948-1949, art. 11, at 705 (1950).
The rule that the question when an acceptance is effective to form a
contract concluded by correspondence is a question of fact now appears
firmly established in the case law of the Cour de cassation. See, e.g., Cave
Cooperative de Novi v. Ric6me, Cour de cassation, chambre des requites,
Jan. 29, 1923, [1923] D. I. 176, [1932] SIREY, RECUEIL GIN]RAL DES LOIS ET DES
ARRETS [hereinafter S.] I. 168; cf. Le Lloyd de France v. Faucheux, Cour de
cassation, chambres des requites, March 21, 1932, [1933] D. I. 65 (note Sall6
de la Marnierre), [19321 S. I. 278. There does not appear to be any judicial
discussion of standards to be applied by the courts in determining this
question of fact. It is not clear whether the result depends on the intention
of the parties, the equities of the situation or the reliance of the offeree.
The commission preparing a draft for a new Civil Code has proposed the
rule that "In the absence of a stipulation to the contrary, a contract is
formed between persons not present at the same place at the time and place
of the emission of the acceptance." TRAVAUX DE LA COMMISSION DE RPFORME
DU CODE CIVIL ANNIE-1948-1949, art. 13, at 706 (1950).
3. The basic code provision is article 1108, which provides that: "Four
conditions are essential to the validity of a contract:
"The consent of the party who binds himself;
"His capacity to contract;
"A defined object which forms the subject matter of the obligation;
"A licit cause in the obligation."
Only one of these conditions, the first, is of importance for the topic under
discussion in this paper. With regard to the first condition, the language of
the Code is misleading, both parties must consent to the transaction even
if the agreement obligates only one of the parties. Cf. 2 COLIN & CAPITANT,
COURS 9LAMENTARIE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 30, § 40 (10th ed., Julliot de la
Morandiere 1953). It is also clear that when consent to a transaction has
been communicated to the other party, as, for example, by an offer, this
consent remains effective, even though the party subsequently changes his
mind, until his change of attitude has been communicated to the other
party. Cf. 2 RIPERT & BOULANGER, TRAITA hLMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL DE PLANIOL
125, § 327, 126, § 331 (4th ed. 1952). Compare also note 2 supra.
It should perhaps be noted that the fourth condition, the requirement of
a licit cause, does not make the enforceability of the agreement turn upon
the presence of an element of bargain in the transaction. The doctrine of
cause is much discussed and its implications much disputed in French legal
writing. See, in general, CAPITANT, DE LA CAUSE DES OBLIGATIONS (3d ed. 1927);
Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration in the LaW of C6ntracts, 28 YALE L.J.
621, 632-34 (1919). As it has been developed and applied by contemporary
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system sets, of course, various limits to the power to create by
agreement legally enforceable obligations. Thus, certain cate-
gories of agreements are not binding if formal requirements
have not been met. And agreements which deeply offend the
community's sense of justice are refused enforcement. In French
law the question whether an enforceable contractual obligation
has been formed is, however, approached by analyzing whether
there was an agreement between the parties.
The general requirements for the formation of a contract
at common law are more complex. The Restatement of Contracts
states them to be "A manifestation of assent by the parties who
form the contract to the terms thereof, and by every promisor
to the consideration for his promise . . ." and "a sufficient con-
sideration. . .. -4 Of course, just as in French law, not all trans-
actions meeting these requirements are enforceable, but the
question whether a contract has been formed is ordinarily
approached by the common law in terms of assent and con-
sideration.5
French law, the doctrine is complex and serves a variety of purposes. It
does not today, however, represent a requirement that the transaction con-
tain an element of bargain. This can be clearly seen from the fact that the
donor's liberal intention is considered the cause of a promise of a gift. Cf.
1 MAURY, ESSAI SUR LE ROLE DE LA NOTION DE L'AQUIVALANCE EN DROIT CIVIL
FRANgAIS 39-72 (Thesis Toulouse, 1920). A promise to give in French law is
never held unenforceable on the ground that it has no cause, but instead
only on the ground that it has not been made in the proper forms. See CODE
CIVIL arts. 931, 932. "It does not follow [in French law] that, because the
cause of an agreement does not have economic value, the agreement has no
cause if it is possible to find in it an intention to make a sacrifice for one's
tranquility, for one's respect, or for the peace of one's conscience." 1 LAROM-
BIiRE, THiORIE ET PRATIQUE DES OBLIGATIONS 288 (2d ed. 1885). "Every obligation,
every promise or transfer which has on the part of the obligor a normal
explanation in the mores of the community is valid." 2 DEMOGUE, TRAITP DES
OBLIGATIONS EN G9N9RAL 544, nO 747 (1923). Cause, in this connection, becomes
a description of what might be called the generalized motivation of the
transaction; it does not require that the transaction, to be enforceable, con-
tain an element of bargain or reciprocity.
4. 1 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 19 (1932). The old common law also recog-
nized the possibility of forming a contractual obligation by a writing under
seal. This possibility has been removed by statute in most of the states of
the United States. See 1 WILLISTON & THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS 659-62, § 218 (rev. ed. 1936); Comment, The Present Status of the
Sealed Obligation, 34 ILL. L. REV. 457 (1939).
5. The Restatement states, though here it does not accurately reflect the
law in all jurisdictions, that "A promise which the promisor should reason-
ably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial
character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action
or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of
the promise." Id. § 90; cf. id. § 45. Some courts have Indicated that this
doctrine may be limited to the field of non-commercial transactions. See
James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933). But see
Robert Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654, 661 (7th Cir. 1941)
("The mere fact that the transaction is commercial in nature should not
preclude the use of the promissory estoppel.").
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The respective merits of the handling of the problem of
formation in the two systems can be determined by examining
how each treats several concrete situations.
The doctrinal mechanism of both systems functions easily
and well for what can be called the normal contract situation,
that is to say, where a bargained-for exchange of economic
values by each side is contemplated. There is present the agree-
ment required by French law and the assent and consideration
which the common law emphasizes.
When the common law comes to deal with situations in
which there is no present exchange of economic values, diffi-
culties arise which are avoided in French law. This can be
demonstrated in connection with two types of arrangements,
the granting of an option and the situation where a promise
contemplates an acceptance in the form of an act of perfor-
mance without the offeree assuming any commitment before
performance, that is to say, the so-called offer for a unilateral
contract.
In commercial life the option is a normal arrangement. A
promises B to sell him certain property or goods for a stated
sum of money if B indicates his willingness to buy within a fixed
period of time. B knows of, and assents to, the option. Does B
have an enforceable option contract? The solution of the French
law is clear." Agreement is present, and agreement is all that is
6. The result, although indicated by the general approach of the Code
to the problem of formation, was not always clear because of articles 1174
("Every obligation contracted under a potestative condition on the part of
the person who obligates himself is void.") and 1589 ("The promise of a
sale is equivalent to a sale when there has been reciprocal agreement be-
tween the parties relative to the object and the price. ... ). Both of these
articles were used in an attempt to fasten the principle of bargain upon the
French law of contracts relating to non-gratuitous transactions.
A promise subject to a condition potestative can be compared to what
Is called in the common law an illusory promise. Article 1174 thus gave a
basis for arguing that an option contract was not binding because the
party holding the option had not promised, as the case might be, to buy or
sell. Some early cases accepted this line of reasoning. See, e.g., Raymond v.
Varlet, Cour d'appel de Paris, 5e chambre, April 26, 1898, [18981 D. II. 526
(employment contract with employer having right to terminate "at the end
of each month by notifying the employee eight days in advance"), quashed,
Cour de cassation, chambre civile, March 1, 1899, [1899] D. I. 360. It now
appears established that article 1174 merely states the platitude that, in a
transaction in which neither side makes a binding promise, no enforceable
obligation arises. Cf. 2 DEMOaUE, TRAITt DES OBLIGATIONS EN GAN2RAL 22, no 475
(1923). However, from time to time, a lower court may even today mis-
apply article 1174 in the context of an option or other one-sided contract.
See, e.g., Vallernaude v. Vignal, Tribunal de premier Instance de Valence,
Dec. 19, 1929, [1930] S. II. 85.
The possible bearing of article 1589 on the validity of the option con-
tract requires explanation. Article 1589 treats a promise to sell as equiva-
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required, as a matter of general principle, in order to form an
enforceable contract. The solution is equally clear in the com-
mon law. B has given no consideration; consequently, there is
no enforceable contract and A may revoke at any time before
B exercises the option.7
If, as would seem to be the case, these option arrangements
when clearly understood by both parties should be binding,8 a
general theory of contract formation which blocks enforcement
is, to this extent at least, unsatisfactory to modern thinking.
The common law courts have done what they could to improve
the situation by enforcing option arrangements in which the
recipient of the option gives something of value which does not
represent a true exchange of values.9 This solution necessarily
puts a premium on legal sophistication.
To turn now to the handling of the offer for a so-called "uni-
lent, under certain circumstances, to a sale. This gives a basis for arguing
that the only promise of sale known to French law is one made in return
for a promise to buy, for a completed sale always involves an element of
reciprocity. This position was stated by Merlin, an early commentator on
the Civil Code, as follows: "And it necessarily follows [from article 1589
of the Civil Code] that the promise to buy is not obligatory if it is not
accompanied by the promise to sell and that, reciprocally, the promise to
sell is null if it is not accompanied by the promise to buy. . . ." 18 MERLIN,
RtPERTOIRE UNIvERSEL ET RAISONNA DE JURISPRUDENCE-VENTE 503, § VII (5th
ed. 1828). Some early cases accepted this line of reasoning. See, e.g., Gon-
guet v. Tardy, Cour d'appel de Lyon, 2e chambre, June 27, 1832, [1833] D. II.
95, [1833] S. II. 285. The argument has, however, long since been rejected In
French law. See, e.g., La Ruche Roubaisienne v. Desquiens, Cour d'appel
de Douai, lere chambre civile, Nov. 2, 1898, 55 JURISPRUDENCE DE LA COUR D'APPEL
BE DOUAi 257 (1898).
7. Some courts may today be willing to apply the promissory estoppel
theory of section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts in these option situa-
tions. See note 5 supra; see also 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 869-70, § 263 (1950);
1 WILLISTON & THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 176, § 61
(rev. ed. 1936).
For a general discussion of the common law treatment of the option,
see 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 855-925, §§ 259-74.
8. An entirely different situation exists, of course, where the option is
contained in a printed form and the full import of the transaction is not
understood by one party. The problems presented by the use of standard
forms might, however, be better handled through selective doctrines de-
signed to distinguish between the fair and the unfair situation rather than
by an approach through the general theory of formation.
9. See 1 CORsIN, CONTRACTS 868-69, § 263 (1950); 1 WILLISTON & THOMPSON,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 179, § 61 (rev. ed. 1936).
In a few states, statutes have modified the consideration requirement
as applied to the option and firm offer problem. See N.Y. Personal Property
Law § 33(5); UNIFORM WRITTEN OBLIGATION ACT (adopted Pa. 1927, Utah 1929,
repealed Utah 1933). UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-205 would make options
for a period not exceeding three months, given by a merchant for the sale
or purchase of goods binding if contained in a signed writing.
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lateral contract." Here a party is said to seek not a promise, but
an act, in return for his promise.10 "I will pay you $15.00 if you
paint (not promise to paint) my porch." Under the traditional
common law analysis, the promise to pay $15.00 does not become
binding, because there is no consideration to support it (the act
requested has not yet been performed and the promisor does not
Wish nor receive a promise of performance), until the porch has
been painted. A result of this analysis is that the promisor can
withdraw his promise to pay $15.00 at any time before the paint-
ing is begun (and possibly at any time before it is completed),
even though he knows that the promisee had begun to prepare
for performing."'
The whole approach of the common law to these situations
is artificial since it eliminates from the court's consideration a
perfectly normal interpretation of the parties' intentions and
operates with the mechanical alternative that both parties are
bound at once or neither party is bound until one party has com-
pleted his performance. French law avoids this Procrustean bed.
Its theory of contract formation enables it to consider a third
possibility, that of an option arrangement. By agreeing to the
owner's proposition, the painter concludes a contract under
which he is entitled to a certain sum of money if the porch is
painted within a reasonable period of time. He does not, presum-
ably, assume any obligation to paint until he has actually begun
the job. The availability of this analysis avoids the difficulties
which the common law has had in handling these "unilateral"
situations and centers the court's attention on the basic func-
tional problem: what did the parties intend?
In many situations, the common law courts have managed
of course, to avoid the consequences which an unsatisfactory
doctrine would seem to require. They will, in interpreting an
10. For discussions of the unilateral contract of the common law, see
Llewellyn, On our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, 48 YALE
L.J. 1, 779 passim (1938, 1939); McGovney, Irrevocable Offers, 27 HARV. L.
REV. 644, 654-63 (1914); Stoljar, The False Distinction Between Bilateral and
Unilateral Contracts, 64 YALE L.J. 515 (1955); Wormser, The True Concep-
tion of Unilateral Contracts, 26 YALE L.J. 136 (1916); Pollock, Book Review,
28 L.Q. REV. 100, 101 (1912).
11. In the hypothetical case stated, it would seem, as a matter of strict
theory, that the offer could be withdrawn at any time before the perfor-
mance was completed. However, a court would presumably treat the situa-
tion as one in which the contract was concluded when the painter com-
menced the job. If this construction were not put on the situation, a quasi-
contractual recovery would probably be available to the promisee for any
benefit actually conferred on the promisor, but the arrangement could not
be enforced as a contract. See 1 WILLISTON & THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE
LAw OF CONTRACTS 172, § 60AA (rev. ed. 1936).
[VOL. XV
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ambiguous situation, find that a present exchange of promises
was intended, thus avoiding the injustice which would be caused
by treating the arrangement as an offer for a unilateral contract.
12
Moreover, the doctrine itself has been modified so that today in
many jurisdictions partial performance, or the tendering of
partial performance, of the requested act in a unilateral contract
situation will bind the promisor to the contract. 13 But, even after
the passage of considerable time and the expenditure of much
effort, the situation in the common law is still unsatisfactory.
III
A legal system's approach to contract formation foreshadows,
and, in considerable measure, determines the general outlines of
its treatment of the problem of form. The functional problem of
form is the same for all systems"4-the usefulness of certain
transactions must be balanced against considerations such as
whether enforcing them may encounter unusual difficulties or
costs and whether they present in practice special dangers to the
person who contemplates entering into them. Formal require-
ments are indicated where such difficulties or dangers clearly
outweigh the complications created by requiring formalities.
The problem of form can be said to be successfully resolved if
formalities are only required for appropriate categories of trans-
actions, if these categories are clearly marked out, and if ade-
quate and workable formalities are provided.
Because its theory of contract formation is based on agree-
ment, French law approaches form as a problem analytically
distinct from formation and imposes its formal requirements
directly. The two most important categories of transactions in
which the Code Civil requires formalities are agreements to
confer a gratuitous benefit (gift) (articles 931 and 932) and
agreements in non-business transactions 5 where the sum or value
12. See id. at 76-77, § 31A, 166, § 60; 1 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 31 (1932).
13. See 1 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 45 (1932); 1 WILLISTON & THOMPSON,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 167-75, §§ 60A-60B (rev. ed. 1936).
14. For excellent discussions of the problem of form, see 2 IHERING,
GEIST DES MMISCHEN RECHTS (2d Part), § 45, 470-504 (8th ed. Basel [1954]);
Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUm. L. REv. 799 (1941). Professor
Fuller distinguishes three possible functions of legal formalities: the evi-
dentiary function, the cautionary function, and the channeling function. See
id. at 800-01. In the text of this paper, in order to simplify the comparative
analysis, the channeling function is not taken into account.
15. Under article 109 of the Commercial Code, as now interpreted by
the courts, the judge can admit oral testimony, when he considers such
testimony desirable, to prove any transaction which is commercial in the
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involved exceeds 5,000 francs (approximately fifteen dollars)
(article 1341).
In the common law, formal requirements are, in consider-
able part, implied in the system's theory of formation. The doc-
trine of consideration indirectly requires a form in all transac-
tions in which there is not a bargained-for exchange of real
economic values. In addition, formalities are directly imposed
by statute of frauds legislation on a variety of transactions in-
cluding: agreements to sell goods the value of which exceeds a
certain amount (usually fifty, one hundred or five hundred dol-
lars), contracts to sell any interest in land, agreements not to be
performed within one year from the making thereof, and surety-
ship agreements.
Considerable evidence exists that both the French law and
the common law impose formal requirements in transactions
where evidentiary or cautionary protection is today not needed.
There appears to be little justification, under modern conditions,
for the Code Civil's imposition of a formal requirement upon all
non-business transactions involving more than approximately
fifteen dollars. In modern times this requirement of French law
has been steadily watered down.18
technical sense unless the law expressly requires a writing. Jaladon v.
Rocher, Cour de cassation, chambre des requites, March 24, 1825, [1825-
1827] S. I. 90; see 4 FUZIER-HERMANN, CODE CIVIL ANNOT., comment 216 to
article 1341 (Demogue ed. 1938).
16. This watering-down of the formal requirement has taken two forms:
a very broad conception of the commencement de preuve par dcrit (article
1347) and a willingness to find that it would have been morally impossible,
under the circumstances of the case, for the party to have obtained a writ-
ing (article 1348).
The scope of article 1347 has been particularly expanded by the use of
procedures, made more effective by a law of May 23, 1942, which amended
articles 324 to 336 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by which the court,
either on its own motion or upon the request of one of the parties, can
question the parties upon the subject matter In litigation. The answers
given by a party in response to the questions put can represent an admis-
sion which will constitute a commencement de preuve par dcrit. Moreover,
If a party does not appear when summoned for such an interrogation, or,
upon appearance, does not answer the questions asked, the court can, pur-
suant to article 336 of the Code of Civil Procedure, consider this conduct
as "equivalent to a beginning of proof by writing under the conditions of
Article 1347 of the Civil Code." H~braud, in a comment on the law of May
23, 1942, [1943) Dalloz, Recuell Critique, LUgislation 10, Indicates that, as a
consequence of this legislation, the formal requirement of article 1341 may
be virtually eliminated in practice. See id. at 11; see also Meurisse, Le
ddclin de la preuve par 4crit, [1951 26 sem.] GAZETTE DUJ PALAIS. Doctrine 50;
MANUEL, LE COMMENCEMENT DE PREUVE PAR ACRIT (Thesis Lyon, 1937).
For an example of the application of the doctrine of moral impossi-
bility under article 1348 see Ihasusta v. Bianchi, Cour de cassation, chambre
civile, March 17, 1938, [19381 D. I. 115 (note Mimin); see also Lyon-Caen,
note to Boutenjeun v. Reynier, Cour de cassation, chambre des requites,
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The provisions of the Statute of Frauds relative to the sale
of goods and to contracts not to be performed within a year have
recently been repealed in England on the ground, among others,
that "they had outlived the conditions which generated and, in
some degree, justified them .... *,17 Nor is the requirement,
resulting from the doctrine of consideration, of a formality in
option agreements justified.
The categories of transactions in which formalities are re-
quired are perhaps somewhat more clearly marked out in French
law than in the common law. The broad scope and general form
of article 1341 avoids certain of the perplexing borderline cases
which arise under statute of frauds legislation.'8 Furthermore,
it is probably easier to mark off the limits of the formal require-
ments applicable to gratuitous transactions where the approach
is, as in French law, through the concept of gift rather than
through the doctrine of consideration. Many of the difficulties
encountered in this area are, however, inherent in the subject
matter and no structure of doctrine can completely avoid prob-
lems of the type discussed in the common law under the headings
of moral consideration, past consideration and charitable sub-
scriptions. 19
March 27, 1907, [1907] S. I. 209, notes 1-4 (this system has "from the prac-
tical point of view .... a great advantage because it leads, in fact, to a-
system in which any method of proof is admissible .. ").
17. Law Reform Committee, First Report, CMD. No. 8809, at 3 (1953);
see generally Recent Statute, 68 HARy. L. REV. 383 (1954).
18. Williston devotes forty pages to a discussion of the statute of
frauds provision relating to the sale of goods. See 2 WMLISTON & THOMPsoN,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 1474-513, §§ 505-24A (rev. ed. 1936).
19. Both the French and the common law must face the problem of
classifying borderline transactions for the purposes of formal requirements.
The common law approaches the question by an analysis based on consider-
ation, imposing a formal requirement if no consideration is found in the
transaction in question. The comparable analysis in French law is in terms
of the concept of gift. French law reaches in borderline situations results
somewhat more restrictive of the scope of formal requirements than does
the common law. For example, a sufficiently strong moral obligation will
lead a French court to refuse to classify a transaction as a gift when a
common law court, in a comparable situation, would fail to find considera-
tion. Compare Pages v. Fr~res Saint-Jean-de-Dieu A Lyon, Cour de cassa-
tion, chambre des requ6tes, May 5, 1868, [1869] D. I. 285 with Mills v. Wy-
man, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) *207 (1825); for the general problem of the moral
obligation in French law, compare Darier v. Dubois, Cour d'appel de Paris,
8e chambre, Nov. 5, 1925, [1925] Dalloz Hebdomadaire 656 (promise of man
to continue to support former mistress who later made a "rich marriage"
held a promise of a gift) with P. v. docteur de L., Cour d'appel de Rennes,
lere chambre, March 7, 1904, [1905] D. II. 305 (note Planiol), [1907] S. II.
214 (promise of man who lived twenty years with a woman to support her
after the relationship was terminated held not a promise of a gift); see
also 7 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAIT PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 316-18, § 982
(2d ed. 1954).
A charitable subscription is, it appears, treated in French law as a dis-
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Various defects can be noted in the adequacy and work-
ability of the formalities provided in each system. Under the
Code Civil an agreement to confer a gift is enforceable if em-
bodied in a notarial contract and expressly accepted by the
donee.20 The courts have also come in time to accept an alter-
native, party-created formality-the disguised donation in which
the gratuitous transaction is cast in the guise of an onerous
transaction. 21 The formality provided by the Code is probably
excessively strict in requiring an express acceptance by the
donee.22 This requirement is avoided by the use of the dis-
guised donation.23 In the case of a transaction involving a sum
or value of more than 5,000 francs, the formal requirement of
French law can be satisfied either by a written instrument, exe-
cuted in the presence of a notary or signed by the parties, or by
a beginning of written proof (that is to say, a writing, emanating
from the party sought to be held and indicating the existence
tinc't form of transaction and, consequently, is not classified as a gift. Cf.
Bailly v. Ville de Nancy, Cour de cassation, chambre civile, Feb. 5, 1923,
[1923] D. I. 20. This treatment is to be contrasted with the approach in
the American common law through consideration, an approach which has
led to some rather curious analyses in the courts' attempt to work out an
acceptable solution. See 1 WILLISTON & THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS 403-09, § 116 (rev. ed. 1936).
20. CODE CIVIL arts. 931, 932.
21. See 3 RIPERT & BOULANGER, TRAITA ULPMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL DE PLANIOL
1067-68, § 3350 (4th ed. 1951); cf. Malapert v. Devaux et Pauly, Cour de cas-
sation, chambre civile, July 11, 1888, [1889] ). I. 479, [18881 S. I. 409. In
order to have a disguised donation, the donor must cast the gratuitous
transaction in the guise of an onerous transaction. For example, a father
will sign what is, on its face, a contract of sale with his son. If the inten-
tion of the parties was that the father's performance was to be uncom-
pensated, the father can be required to perform and the son need not make
his performance. Similarly, if the parties recite in a document that the son
has paid the father a sum of money in return for which the father obli-
gates himself to make a certain performance, the father must perform
even though the son has not, in fact, made such a payment.
The disguised donation can be compared with the doctrine of nominal
consideration. In this connection it is interesting to consider the justifi-
cation advanced for the disguised donation: "[Tihe will of the donor finds
in the deception to which the donor believes it is necessary to have recourse
the equivalence of the protection which the [code] requirement of form
would have procured for it. The donor must so arrange the contract con-
taining the gift as to give it the appearance of an onerous juridical act.
The donor is thus clearly aware of the scope of his obligation." 3 RIPERT &
BOULANGER, op. cit. supra at 1068, § 3351.
22. The requirement of an express acceptance has been criticized. "It
is an element of the formalism of the act, designed to make the donation
still more solemn and, as a consequence, still more difficult. The Parlement
of Paris introduced this rule. . . . There is no longer today any reason to
preserve this exaggerated formalism. It is curious that the drafters of the
Civil Code maintained the rule without any criticism having been made of
it." Capitant, Preface xiv in 1 REGNAULT, LES ORDONNANCES CIVILES DU CHAN-
CELIER DAOUESSEAU-LES DONATIONS ET L'ORDONNANCE DE 1731 (1929).
23. Morizot et Gu~rard v. Compagnie le Ph6nix, Cour de cassation,
chambre civtle, Oct. 18, 1909, [19103 D. I. 462, [1911] S. I. 489 (note Tissier).
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of the obligation which is to be proved) .24 This last alternative
has, as was probably inevitable, given rise to considerable liti-
gation in the process of defining its scope.
2 1
The common law statute of frauds legislation provides ade-
quate and workable formalities: a memorandum or note in writ-
ing, signed by the party to be charged or by his authorized
representative, and, alternatively, for the sale of goods, the
giving of "somethinig in earnest to bind the bargain or in part
payment." A major defect in the common law's handling of the
problem of form exists, however, in its failure to provide an
adequate and workable formality for those transactions where
the lack of consideration results in a promise unenforceable
without form. In the older common law a satisfactory formality
was available in the seal. Today, a gratuitous promise under
seal is not enforceable in most jurisdictions. 26 The only other
formality available is nominal consideration-the casting of the
gift transaction in the form of a bargained-for exchange of
economic values.2 7 The involvement of the question of available
formalities with the general doctrine of consideration has com-
plicated the judicial administration of this formality. It may, by
obscuring the true function of nominal consideration, have led
some courts to refuse, due to a misunderstanding of the real
problem at issue, to accept certain types of nominal consideration.
Thus, in the case of Schnell v. Nell,2 where the gift promise of
money was cast in the form of an exchange by the donee prom-
ising one cent in return, the court refused to enforce the promise
even though the parties had obviously used the technique of
nominal consideration in an effort to find a formality by which
the promise could be made binding. In some states there is, in
consequence, no longer any legal device available which will
bind the promisor to a gratuitous promise.29 Even when nominal
24. CODE CiviL art. 1341 requires a written instrument either executed in
the presence of a notary or signed by the parties. Articles 1347 and 1348
introduce certain exceptions to this formal requirement, the most important
of which is the provision that a so-called beginning of written proof will
satisfy the formal requirement of article 1341.
25. For one aspect of the evolution of article 1347, see note 16 supra.
26. See 1 WILLISTON & THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
659-62, § 218 (rev. ed. 1936).
27. If A asks, in return for his promise to give B $10,000, that B promise
to give (or that B give) A a pepper corn, B's promise (or performance)
furnishes consideration to support A's promise.
28. 17 Ind. 29, 79 Am. Dec. 453 (1861); see also Fischer v. Union Trust
Co., 138 Mich. 612, 101 N.W. 852 (1904) (promise of an indeterminate value,
nominal consideration of one dollar held not to satisfy requirement of con-
sideration).
29. See FULLER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 318 (1947).
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consideration is recognized, it remains a formality which is less
comprehensible to the layman than is the notarial contract of
French law.
Thus, the French Civil Code appears to be somewhat superior
to the common law in its handling of the problem of form. The
superiority here is not so marked, however, as was the case with
regard to contract formation.
IV
The superiority of the French Civil Code to the common
law in these two basic areas of the law of contracts is not purely
fortuitous. It would seem to be due, at least in part, to the
fact of codification and to the habits of thought and patterns of
development associated with codification on the Continent of
Europe. In both legal systems the law of contracts was, in its
beginnings, primitive and unsuited to the commercial and indus-
trial societies which were later to emerge.
The formless, fully executory agreement, so necessary for
trade and commerce, was not enforced. The economic life of
England and the Continent had to flow, even when a trading
economy began to develop, within the legal framework of the
formal contract and of the half-executed transaction, that is to
say, a transaction fully performed on one side. In neither legal
system was the task of developing a law of contracts appropriate
for the emerging economic order simple or easy. Ultimately,
both legal orders made available what was indispensable: a body
of contract doctrine by which ordinary, executory business
agreements, involving a future exchange of values, could be made
enforceable.
The new law of contracts began to grow up on the Continent
and in England through the practices of merchants, which early
developed into a jus mercatorum administered by courts of
merchants. The practices of merchants were, at first, devoid of
all sanction by the legal order and could not be invoked in the
existing law courts. But as early as about 1116, the Count of
Flanders "instituted in most of his towns local courts of 6chevins,
chosen from among the burgesses and alone competent to judge
them. Sooner or later the same thing happened in all countries.
In Italy, France, Germany and England the towns obtained
judicial autonomy, which made them islands of independent
[VOL. XV
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jurisdiction lying outside the territorial custom. °30 Merchants
came in the eleventh century to assert the force of their own
practices against the customary law.31 For example, they claimed
that sales concluded at fairs should be binding regardless of
whether they were made in the proper legal forms, for such was
the custom of merchants32 Mercantile practices tended, in gen-
eral, to develop informal and flexible transactions appropriate
for active commercial life. And the merchant courts provided
expeditious procedures and prompt justice administered by men
who were themselves merchants and fully aware of mercantile
problems and customs.83
In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the development of
the law of contracts on the Continent and in England began to
diverge as different forces came into play in molding the com-
mon and the civil laws. In England, the common law of con-
tracts was to be developed pragmatically and judicially. Until
the fifteenth century this development went forward in the
King's and many other courts. Indeed, the Courts of the
Boroughs, of the Fairs and of the Staples administered a law of
contracts more suited to the needs of business than that available
in the King's Courts.8 4 In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,
the jurisdiction of the King's Courts showed a pronounced ten-
dency to become progressively more exclusive. It was perhaps
logical and inevitable that, after an effective, centralized adminis-
tration of justice had been established, it should seek to acquire
an exclusive jurisdiction. In all events, with the decline of the
Courts of the Fairs and other local courts in the second half of
the fifteenth century, the common law of contracts entered upon
a decisive stage in its evolution. It was not without importance
for the law which developed that this stage was presided over
by the common law courts and the practicing legal profession.
From perhaps the thirteenth century, the medieval common
law had dealt with contractual problems primarily through two
actions, debt and covenant. 5 Where a fixed sum of money was
30. PIRENNE, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL EUROPE 53 (Clegg
transl. 1937).
31. See GOLDSCHMIDT, UNIVERSALGESCHICHTE DES HANDELSHECHTS 305 (1891).
32. MITCHELL, AN ESSAY ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW MERCHANT
10-11 (1904).
33. See id. at 12-16.
34. See generally FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW 289-98
(1949).
35. See id. at 330. The availability of certain special techniques, such as
the penalty bond under seal, recognized by the common law courts, should
not be overlooked. See Thorne, Tudor Social Transformation and Legal
Change, 26 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 10, 19-22 (1951).
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owed, under an express or implied agreement, for a thing or ben-
efit given, simple debt lay to recover the sum. Debt on a specialty
was available for breach of a promise, made in a sealed instrument,
to pay a fixed amount of money. Covenant could be brought for
breach of a promise under seal (but until rather late in the
history of the action only if the promise were not to pay a
fixed sum of money).36 These actions did not provide a remedy
for the breach of an informal, executory agreement 7 In the
fifteenth century, the common law courts started to develop a
form of action which would render such agreements enforceable.
By "the middle of the sixteenth century the modern conception
of contract [in the common law] had, in essence, been formu-
lated."-" Assumpsit provided a comprehensive remedy for execu-
tory, parol agreements.
It was now necessary for the common law courts to deter-
mine the limits of the new action. The problem was put in an
early case. "Truly, if this action is maintained, one shall have
trespass on the case for breach of any agreement in the world. '8 9
The courts found the limiting principle in the doctrine of consid-
eration. 40 This doctrine came, as it was developed, to embody
the concept of bargain. Many theories have been offered to
explain why the common law adopted the principle of bargain
while the continental legal systems were developing in the
direction of a principle of agreement which would enable them
to deal more simply and directly with promissory situations in
36. It is interesting to note that a writing under seal was originally not
always required for the action of covenant. See FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES
OF THE COMMON LAW 219-20, 257-58 (1949). At first there was no great point
made of the requirement of a deed or even a writing in covenant, which
was then used chiefly between landlord and tenant and to enforce other
agreements relative to land. It "might have been adapted to the enforce-
ment of contractual promises in general, and it was almost a century [i.e.,
almost the fourteenth century] before the common law definitely indicated
that it would not take this important step." Recommendation of the Law
Revision Commission Relating to the Seal and Consideration 15 (1936) in
STATE OF NEW YORK SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION
95 (1936). If the requirement of a seal had not grown up the common law
would have had a general contractual action, based not upon bargain but
upon a unilateral promise, at a very early date. See FIFOOT, HISTORY AND
SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW 257 (1949).
37. Some concessions were made by the common law in the case of
sales, which became in effect a consensual contract with the seller having
an action in debt and the buyer an action in detinue. But this change, due
In part to mercantile pressure, was only "an artificial, if salutary, refinement
upon existing principle." Id. at 330.
38. Id. at 339. The evolution of assumpsit was slow and involved. Fifoot
gives an excellent sketch of the development. See id. at 330-57.
39. Y.B. 3 Hen. 6, 36, pl. 33.
40. For an excellent discussion of the development of the doctrine of con-
sideration see FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW 395-443 (1949).
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which there is no element of bargain. Doubtless there is no
single or simple explanation. However, at least four elements
in the English picture may help to explain this divergent devel-
opment.
First, there is the fortuitous element of the inherited mater-
ials with which the system had to work. "The Elizabethan
judges, though the choice was not consciously present to their
minds, were impelled by every tradition of the common law to
prefer the principle of bargain. Gratuitous promises were asso-
ciated with the writ of covenant and were excluded from the
province of Debt sur contract. During the early experiments
with assumpsit the idea of reciprocity was constantly asserted."'
It is thus understandable that the judges came to insist, through
the doctrine of consideration, upon an element of bargain in the
transaction which they were asked to enforce.
Second, case law, in the process of formulating the prin-
ciple that executory parol agreements were enforceable, would
have found it rather difficult to develop a formality, such as the
notarial contract adopted in France, to provide guarantees against
the dangers inherent in gratuitous promises. Such guarantees
were already present in the actions of debt upon a specialty
and covenant, which could be brought to enforce gratuitous
promises under seal. It may, therefore, well have been sound
judicial statesmanship to leave the enforcement of gifts to these
actions.
Third, the development of assumpsit was doubtless basically
due to pressures from important commercial interests and was
carried on largely by the practicing legal profession. Such
interests, and such advocates, did not seek a general sanction for
all executory agreements, including charitable gifts, but only
for business enterprise.42
Fourth, the common law of contract was little influenced by
the speculation of learned men, relatively remote from the day
to day practice of the law as were many of the civilians and
canonists who played such a large role in the development of the
general principles of the law of contractual obligation in France.
The common law of contracts developed concretely and prag-
matically, not systematically and speculatively. The absence of
general theory can be seen even as late as Blackstone (1723-
41. See id. at 398.
42. Cf. id. at 399.
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1780) who disposes of the subject of contract in a few pages
forming a kind of appendix to his treatment of the law of prop-
erty.4 3 It is perhaps inherent in the method and manner of the
development of the common law that the doctrine evolved to
rationalize, and limit, the enforceability of parol executory agree-
ments should not be "as wide as morality and as warm as con-
science" but should rather be "commercialized into the price of a
bargain. '4
4
On the Continent of Europe, the process through which a law
of contracts appropriate for the needs of the emerging commer-
cial society was developed is significantly different. By the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries, speculative and systematic thought
began to play a role of increasing importance in the development
of the new law of contracts. The characteristics of the theory of
formation and of the approach to the general problem of form
today found in the French Civil Code result, in considerable
measure, from the efforts of speculative and systematic thinkers
in reworking the primitive contract law with which both they
and the common law began.
The Church supported strongly the proposition that a simple,
formless promise should be binding: pacta sunt servanda. This
attitude was to encourage the development of formless contracts
even though the canonists were divided on the question whether
formless civil obligations could be enforced by the Church in
those fields where it had civil jurisdiction.45 By the thirteenth
century canonists were writing that "even the 'nude pact' [of
Roman law] should be enforced, at any rate by penitential
discipline. '46 In the course of the development of the canonists'
thinking on these matters, the notion of causa, which had played
such a limited role in Roman law, 47 came to be used as a new
43. See FULLER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 303-04 (1947).
44. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW 398 (1949).
45. See SEUFFERT, ZUR GESCHICHTE DER OBLIGATORISCHEN VERTRAEGE 52 (1881).
46. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 195 (2d ed. 1898).
The teaching of the later canonists has been summarized as follows:
"(1) The promise must be intentional; (2) it is subject to be taken back in
consequence of a material change of circumstances; (3) it must have a
reasonable cause, which may consist either in a material equivalent or moral
considerations; (4) a liberal disposition is to be deemed a sufficient cause
In the case of gifts; (5) promises to moral persons, to political, learned,
or religious bodies are legally valid if they are made for the sake of their
moral aims, e.g. for the honour of God, the advancement of learning, assist-
ance of the poor, and the like." Vinogradoff, Reason and Conscience in
Sixteenth-Century Jurisprudence, 24 L.Q. REV. 373, 382 (1908).
47. The law of contracts found in Justinian's Institutes and Digest recog-
nized several categories of transactions: Four types of nominate or named
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vestimentum ("garment"), thus maintaining continuity with
Romanist teaching by fitting the canonist doctrine of pacta sunt
servanda into the framework of the pacta vestita ("clothed
pact") 48 and providing a substitute for formal requirements by
insuring, through the requirement of a causa, that a serious
intention to assume a legal obligation had existed.4 9
Perhaps the most important speculative and systematic in-
fluence upon the development of contract law in Europe from
contracts were enforced at this stage in the development of Roman law:
re, a contract (of which there were four types: mutuum, a loan for con-
sumption, commodatum, a loan for use, depositum, a deposit, pignus, a
pledge or a pawn) in which the obligation arose from the handing over of
a thing; verbis, a contract (the well-known stipulation) in which the obli-
gation depended upon a form of words; lUtteris, a contract (which had be-
come obsolete) in which the obligation depended upon a special kind of
writing; and consensu, a contract, of which only four special cases (sales,
hire, partnership, and mandate) were recognized, in which the obligation
rested upon agreement alone. A large group of transactions, which were not
referable to one of the recognized named contracts, formed a second group
of contracts, the so-called innominate or unnamed contracts (including ex-
change and compromise). In all of these contracts there is the common
feature that something is done or given on one side which gives rise to a
duty on the other. See LEE, THE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW 335, § 510 (3d ed.
1952). A third group of agreements, some of which came to be enforceable,
were not classified as contracts but as pacts. An unenforceable pact was
called a bare pact and could be pleaded as a defense. See id. at 335-37, §
511. Pacts which were made actionable were called pacta vestita, clothed
pacts.
The principal reference to causa found in the Justinian Code Is in THE
DIGEST, 2. 14. 7. pr.-4. The passage has been commented upon as follows:
"[This] famous passage (especially D. 2. 14. 7. 4, which states that: 'If
there is no additional ground (causa), in that case it is certain that no obli-
gation can be created, (I mean) on the mere agreement; so that a bare
agreement (nudum pactum) does not produce an obligation, it only produces
an exceptio.'] on which the whole theory of cause was based, and which was
taken to mean that every contract must have a cause, in reality says nothing
of the kind. It distinguishes between agreements which have been recognized
as nominate contracts, such as sale and hire, and agreements for which
no special regime has been laid down. Then it goes on to say that in all
these latter cases there will still be an action provided that there is also
cause. The text, which may well be due to the compilers, clearly deals with
what later came to be known as innominate contracts, and causa here means
what English lawyers call executed consideration. The contracts are of the
type do ut des, do ut facias, facio ut des, or facio ut facias. Then the passage
goes on to say that if there is no causa, it is a case of nudum pactum, which
will give rise to an exception but not to an action.
"Causa is here evidently made to play a part only in the theory of in-
nominate contracts. It has nothing to do with the consensual contracts,
which have always been recognized to present a serious difficulty, but It has
also, for the purposes of this passage, nothing whatever to do with the
real or verbal contracts either. In other words, all it says is that executed
consideration is required where no r6gimes have been set up for particular
contracts." BUCKLAND & McNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 229-30 (2d
rev. ed., Lawson 1952).
48. See CHEVRIER, EssM SUR L'HISTOIRE DE LA CAUSE DANS LES OBLIGATIONS
174-75 (1929).
49. See id. at 15-16. See also the discussion at page 705 infra and the
quotation from the Summa of Angelus Carletus given in note 59 infra.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [VOL. XV
the twelfth century on was the revived study of Justinian's
Corpus Juris Civilis. Certain Roman law practices had, of course,
been continued as custom in the period before the revival of
Roman law. The revival of classical Roman law, however, in-
creased immeasurably the Roman influence upon the developing
law of contracts.
This influence was to lie in two directions. First, the study
of the Corpus Juris Civilis stimulated men to rediscover or con-
struct a general law concerning the validity of agreements.
Second, the Roman law, as crystallized in Justinian's law books,
tended both to confirm the notion already present in the old
customary practices that something more than a formless ex-
pression of agreement must be required if an action is to be
given and to introduce the idea, through the learning about in-
nominate or unnamed contracts,5" that the number of recognized
types of enforceable, purely consensual transactions was
limited. The Roman law maxim, "ex nudo pacto non oritur
actio"'1 was commented upon, often in picturesque phrases, 2
and became a part of the civilian's doctrine of contract. 53
The Roman learning relative to innominate contracts, and
Roman maxims such as "ex nudo pacto non oritur actio," could
have formed the basis for a development in the civil law of
contracts of a doctrine rather similar to the common law doc-
trine of consideration. It would not have been difficult, by
50. See note 47 supra.
51. See note 47 supra.
52. Azo, in his famous Summa, written in the first quarter of the thir-
teenth century, discussed the clothing of naked pacts as follows:
"Moreover, a pact is clothed in six ways: by a thing, by words, by
consent, by a writing, by having a connection with a contract and by the
interposition of a thing. It must be observed that the pact is said to be
clothed in these first four ways because it was never without these garments
and began to have them upon its coming into existence. It is clothed in the
last two ways after its birth. When we make a pact it is, in fact, born
naked, as is proved by the continuation of the two sections . . . [D. 2. 14. 7. 4
and 5], but, once born, the pact looks around and opens its eyes to see
whether it has been preceded or can be followed or whether there is at
once some contract, the clothes of which it puts on so as to drive away the
north wind and the fury of the storm and be able to give its help to its
master in the action. The pact is made, in fact, immediately, that is, a little
before the contract or a little after the contract or in the same contract-
I do not distinguish whether the contract is bonae fidei or stricti juris ...
A pact can [also] be clothed by the interposition of a thing, as in the in-
nominate contracts, which do not at the beginning give any action but, in
which, after the thing is interposed and delivered the action belongs to him
who clothed the contract by the Interposition of the thing. ... Translated
from the Latin text as given in SELECT PASSAGES FROM THE WORKS OF BRACTON
AND Azo 143-44 (Maitland ed., Selden Society, 1895).
53. See SEUFFERT, ZuR GESCHICHTE DER OBLIGATORISCHEN VERTRAEGE 34-45
(1881).
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using the concept of causa, to have fastened the principle of
bargain upon the civil law. Some such development might well
have occurred if the civil law of contracts had developed judi-.
cially and pragmatically. That it did not occur is doubtless due
in part to chance, but also, it would seem, in part to the specu-
lative and systematic thought of jurists. Consider the tenden-
cies discernible in the Italian literature of the fifteenth century:
First, the actionability of formless contracts concluded between
merchants was generally accepted. Second, the theory was cur-
rent that a nudum pactum geminatum (a "twin-born naked
pact") was actionable: It was held that a nude pact produced
a natural obligation and that the repetition of the nude pact
made this original natural obligation enforceable. This theory
was based upon an extension of the constitutum 4 of Roman
law and a misunderstanding of the Roman law conception of
the naturalis obligatio.55 It was also connected with the expla-
nation, which now came to be offered for the Roman law rules
relative to nude pacts, that such pacts were not enforceable
because of the need for protecting inexperienced persons from
the consequences of unconsidered statements. 56 The repetition
of the statement tended to provide a safeguard against incon-
siderate action, the reason for not enforcing the transaction
thus ceasing to exist.5 7 Third, some jurists held that an action
de dolo would lie for damages caused by breach of an informal
pact. 58 Fourth, the canon law doctrines were discussed by most
civilists. But only at the very end of the century, and then only
with a very few writers, was there any notion of the general
applicability of these doctrines.59
54. The constitutum was a praetorian action based on an informal under-
taking to pay an existing debt at a fixed time. At first the debt had to be
of money, but this rule had disappeared by the time of Justinian. The
constitutum was void if there were no real debt, but a naturalis obligatio
sometimes sufficed (see note 55 infra) to satisfy this requirement. See
BUCKLAND, A MANUAL OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 308-09 (2d ed. 1939).
55. See SEUFFERT, ZUR GESCHTICHTE DER OBLIGATORISCHEN VERTRAEGE 76-77
(1881). In Roman law a nude pact usually did not create a natural obliga-
tion, although there were a few exceptions. See BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF
ROMAN LAW 553 (2d ed. 1932). The effect of a natural obligation varied, how-
ever. The only rules common to all natural obligations were that no action
lay and that a payment made to discharge such an obligation could not be
recovered. See id. at 552. In particular, not all natural obligations could
form the basis of a constitutum. See SEUFFERT, op. cit. supra, at 19.
56. See id. at 68, 76-77.
57. See id. at 76-77, 80.
58. See id. at 84-85.
59. See id. at 85-86. It is interesting to note in this connection that the
canonists were, in their turn, influenced by the teachings of the civilians.
By the fifteenth century the canonists sought to reconcile their teachings
with the Roman law principle, ex nudo pacto non oritur actio, by develop-
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By the sixteenth century the importance of speculative
and systematic thought in shaping continental thinking on con-
tract law is clearer and greater. The natural law philosophers
took up such ideas as the principle, pacta sunt servanda, sup-
ported originally by the Church, the merchants,60 and certain
civilists. The influence of natural law can be seen in the work
of a jurist and legislator such as the German Ulrich Zasius
(1461-1535). In his legal writings Zasius taught the Roman law
rule that an action could not be based on a nudum pactum.01
When, however, asked in 1520 to draft the city law of Freiburg
he provided for the enforceability of nude pacts.6 2 But Zasius
did not, even as a legislator, abandon the Roman teaching rela-
tive to innominate contracts. 3 The city law of Freiburg expli-
citly provided that an exchange is not binding without part
performance. 4 The influence of natural law theories is also
seen in the writings of the German, Matthdus Wesenbeck (1531-
1586), and the Frenchman, Charles Dumoulin (1500-1566), who
were probably the most influential supporters in the sixteenth
ing the doctrine of a causa clothing the naked pact. A pact was declared
valid if it were adorned by an adequate causa. "The definition of causa was
a more embarrassing task and encouraged ingenious speculation, but, by
the general consensus of opinion, the doctrine required the plaintiff to prove
only that the promise had been made with a serious purpose. Unless his
design was manifestly unreasonable or improper, the promisor was bound.
Nor need his aim be commercial: benevolence, piety or the discharge of
a moral obligation sufficed." See FFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON
LAW 306 (1949); see also note 46 supra. Fifoot quotes an interesting fifteenth
century example of such writing from the Summa Angelica of Angelus
Carletus:
"The question is whether a man is bound by a naked pact or simple
promise. The answer is that he is so bound by canon law and in conscience,
under pain of mortal sin, provided that a cause is expressed, as if I prom-
ise you ten pounds because you have sold me such a thing or have lent me
the money, and so forth. But if it be so naked that no cause is added, he
is not bound even in conscience; and the reason is that he is taken to have
made the promise in error .... But notice that, if a man say, I promise to
give you a hundred pounds, then the liberality of the promise is presumed
to be the cause of the gift, and so it is not without cause. So, too, if any-
thing is promised to a pious foundation, because he is taken to have bound
himself for motives of piety .... No one is bound from whatever cause
unless he has intended to bind himself. He is not required, under pain of
mortal sin, to keep a naked pact, unless there exist a cause which requires
him to be so bound by moral precept, as if I have promised my robe to
my father, who is perishing with cold; for in such a case as this a man is
bound, even if he never intended to be bound." Ibid.
60. MITCHELL, AN ESSAY ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW MERCHANT
102 (1904).
61. See SEUFFERT, ZUR GESCHICHTE DER OBLIGATORISCHEN VERTRAEOE 96-97
(1881).
62. See id. at 99-102. Seuffert considers this the earliest German legisla-
tion providing for the actionability of nude pacts. See id. at 101.
63. See note 47 supra.
64. See SEUFFERT, ZUR GESCHICHTE DER OBLIGATORISCHEN VERTRAEGE 100(1881).
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century of the validity of informal contracts.0 5 However, Wesen-
beck, as had Zasius, still made the actionability of innominate
contracts, especially contracts of exchange, depend upon part
performance. 6
The speculative and systematic thought embodied in the
principle of the enforceability of formless contracts did not,
therefore, operate at this period to break down completely the
limited contractual categories of the Roman law.61 Some of the
writers appear to have failed to see that the actionability of
nude pacts led logically to the binding effect of consensual
innominate contracts. Others rationalized the result by seeing
in an innominate transaction before part performance only pre-
liminary, non-obligatory dealings.0 8 Only a very few, among
them the German Peter Gudelin (1550-1619), argued for the
binding effect of innominate contracts before part performance.0 9
By the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seven-
teenth century, the number and influence of the supporters
among legal writers and philosophers of the validity of form-
less contracts increased markedly, even though the oppos-
ing view did not entirely disappear."" The writings of Grotius
(1583-1645) 7 " and Pufendorf (1632-1694), which based the bind-
ing effect of formless, executory contracts on natural law, had
great influence. The large majority of seventeenth century
writers continued, however, to treat innominate contracts as
unenforceable in the absence of part performance. 72 The great
65. For Wesenbeck, see id. at 106-08; for Dumoulin, see SPIES, DE L'OBSER-
VATION DES SIMPLES CONVENTIONS EN DROIT CANONIQUE 221-25 (Thesis Nancy, 1928).
66. See SEUFFERT, ZUR GESCHICHTE DER OBLIGATORISCHEN VERTRAEGE 107-08
(1881).
67. See id. at 119-29.
68. See 4d. at 143.
69. See id. at 128-29.
70. See id. at 118-19; see generally 4d. at 119-29.
71. See especially DE JURE BELLI AC PACS LISRI TRES, bk. II, c. xi (1625),
where Grotius argues that every deliberately made promise is binding. For
an English translation of this work see 2 GRoTius, DE JURE BELLI AC PACS
LIBRl TRES (Kelsey transl. 1925).
72. See the quotations in SEUFFERT, ZUR GESCHICHTE DER OBLIGATORISCHEN
VERTRAEGE 130-38 (1881). Spies considers that the general enforceability of
formless, executory contracts was accepted in French practice during the
first half of the sixteenth century. See SPIES, DE L'OBSERVATION DES SIMPLES
CONVENTIONS EN DROIT CANONIQUE 217, 221 (Thesis Nancy, 1928). He connects
this development in the practice with the Ordinance of Villers-Cotterets
(1539) which ended the plaintiff's right to choose between civil and ecclesi-
astical courts in ordinary personal actions. See 4d. at 217-19. If the civil
courts had not so changed the rules of law which they administered, cer-
tain formless, executory, contracts, which were formerly enforced In the
ecclesiastical courts, would have been rendered unenforceable by the abo-
lition of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
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French lawyer Domat (1625-1696) was one of the few who con-
sidered all formless, executory contracts binding. "[AIll con-
tracts, whether they have a particular name or not, have always
their effect, and oblige the parties to what is agreed on."7 3 The
legislation of this period fell by and large into the same pattern.
It accepted, in general, the actionability of formless contracts
but did not draw from this principle the conclusion that innom-
inate contracts were enforceable without part performance.
74
The eighteenth century saw the speculative and systematic
thought of jurists and philosophers finally and fully carry the
day. The enforceability of formless contracts was generally
recognized and most legal writers supported the proposition that
executory innominate contracts were also thereby made action-
able.7 5 And the position taken by the legal writers is reflected
in the legislation of the period.76
Such are the general outlines of the long and complex proc-
ess which gave France, along with Western Europe as a whole,
the basis for a general law of contractual obligations largely
freed from historical anachronisms and capable of being de-
veloped in functional terms. Consensual and formless contracts
had been accepted by the legislator and justified by the theorist.
The Roman law's closed contract system which, through the
learning about nominate contracts, innominate contracts and
nude pacts, in effect held contractual transactions within the
limiting framework of recognized contractual types, had been
supplanted by the new learning. Men were now permitted to
transact more freely in terms of their needs and desires. The
ground was cleared for the great codifications of the nineteenth
century. They could, starting with a theory of formation based
on agreement, approach rationally the problem of the element
of formality which should be required before the legal order will
sanction a particular type of transaction.
The theory of contract formation and the approach to the
problem of form thus prepared for the drafters of the French
Civil Code fitted in remarkably well with their intellectual pre-
73. DOMAT, LES LOIS CIVILES DANS LEUR ORDRE NATUREL, Book I, Title I, § 1,
VII (2d ed. 1695); for an English translation, see 1 DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN
ITS NATURAL ORDER 162, para. 150 (Strahan transl., Cushing ed. 1850).
74. See SEUFERT, ZUa GESCHICHTE DER OBLIGATORISCHEN VERTRAEGE 144-65
(1881) for examples of such legislation.
75. See id. at 138-44.
76. For example, the state law of Bavaria recognizes, with a clear ref-
erence to natural law, the actionability of formless contracts, including exe-
cutory, innominate contracts. See id. at 165-66.
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conceptions and with the technique of a code. The theory of
formation, based as it was on agreement, was rational, offered
the generality which codification required, and raised directly
and clearly the problem of form. This problem could in its turn
be handled in a code through formalities, particularly various
requirements of writing, that were understandable to the ordi-
nary person and peculiarly appropriate for legislative adoption.
The common law, as has been pointed out above, never
managed to develop a general approach to formation and for-
mality which went beyond the requirements of the typical busi-
ness transaction, envisaging an exchange of economic values, to
deal helpfully with more marginal problems such as those pre-
sented by the commercial option, the so-called "unilateral con-
tract," and the promise to give. Lord Mansfield, perhaps the
most speculative of the great common law judges, attempted
such a further development of the doctrinal structure of the
common law in Pillans v. Van Mierop.27 He made two argu-
ments: First, that the case, being commercial, was governed
by the customs of merchants which did not require considera-
tion. Second, that consideration, even where no business interest
was involved, had a purely evidentiary function and, conse-
quently, need not be shown where the agreement was in writing.
But Mansfield's attempted innovations were soon repudiated.7 8
The more satisfactory treatment accorded problems of for-
mation and form in the Code Civil as compared with the com-
mon law seems to be due, in large measure, to the role which
speculative and systematic thought played in the evolution and
ultimate codification of the French law. At least until recent
77. 3 Burrows 1663, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (K.B. 1765).
78. The efforts of Lord Mansfield and the subsequent reaction are
sketched in FIFOOT, IIISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW 406-11 (1949);
see also FIFOOT, LORD MANSFIELD 118-41 (1936). Pillans v. Van Mierop was
overruled by the House of Lords in Rann v. Hughes, 7 Term R. 350 note,
101 Eng. Rep. 1014 (1778). "In Rann v. Hughes Lord Mansfield had held
an administratrix liable upon a written promise, made in her personal
capacity, to pay a debt due by the deceased to the plaintiff. [Footnote
omitted.] The judgment was reversed in the Exchequer Chamber and the
reversal sustained in the House of Lords. Buller, for the plaintiff, urged
uncompromisingly the intrinsic validity of a written agreement. He dared
to impugn the sanctity of the Deed. To affix a seal was notoriously a farce,
and, if so trivial an act dispensed with consideration, why should it be
required where the parties, by embodying their terms in a document, even
if unsealed, had attested to their serious purpose? But two centuries of
precedents were not to be 'melted down into common sense.' The general
opinion of the judges, accepted by the Lord Chancellor, declared the anti-
thesis of written and oral agreements to be heretical; and consideration
remained a vital element in all contracts not under seal." FIFOOT, HISTORY
AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW 409 (1949).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
times, the common law has not benefited from any comparable
efforts to think legal problems through systematically and to
develop a rationalized body of legal solutions, rules, principles
and doctrines. Nor has the common law had the benefit of a
thorough legislative reshaping in the course of which many in-
herited complexities and encumbrances could be discarded. In
some areas of the law of contracts the common law may be
better today just because this has not taken place; but it would
seem that the common law pays a price in other areas-areas
which can benefit from rationalized, speculatively developed
doctrines and in which the greater freedom of action at any
given point in time ordinarily possessed by a legislature as com-
pared with a court can be of considerable importance in deter-
mining the shape the law will take. At least these are the con-
clusions suggested by a comparative study of the evolution of
contract in the civil and common laws.
V
This brief investigation of the history and present day
functioning of legal concepts in two important areas of the
French and the common law of contracts-the theory of forma-
tion and the problem of form-may be suggestive for the com-
parative study of contracts. They may also be significant for an
understanding of fundamental differences between the common
and the civil laws.
There are various areas of the law in which general and rela-
tively rationalized doctrines appear to operate more effectively
than do doctrines whose fabric, though richer, is more prag-
matic and less capable of generalized application. These are the
areas where a general policy is needed, a policy which can then
be tailored to take into account particular difficulties by the
use of more specific, supplementary rules. The common law
may have more difficulty than the civil law in developing and
using such general policies as guides to legal reasoning. It has
been suggested above that this is the case with respect to for-
mation and formality in the law of contracts. And it should be
remembered, in this connection, that the basis for the relatively
satisfactory approach to the problems of form and formality
found today in French law was laid in a codification made one
hundred and fifty years ago.
In other areas of the law, of course, more precise and con-
crete principles are needed. In these areas the advantage may
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lie with the common law, particularly when compared with a
relatively old codification such as the Code Civil. It is perhaps
true that in such areas a codified system tends more than the
common law to treat rules and principles as ultimate verities
rather than working hypotheses. Here the process through
which the common law develops probably tends to operate,
over the long run, to its advantage. In the common law rather
more than the civil law "Every new case is an experiment. ...
The principles themselves are continually retested; for if the
rules derived from a principle do not work well, the principle
itself must ultimately be reexamined."7 9
79. SMITH, JURISPRUDENCE 21 (1909). See also von Mehren, The Judicial
Process in the United States and in France-A Comparative Study, 22 RE-
VISTA JURIDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO Rico 235 (1952-53); von Mehren, The
Judicial Process In the United States and Germany, A Comparative Analysis,
in 1 FESTSCHRIFT FUR ERNST RABEL 68 (1954).
